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KEEPING LEGAL HISTORY "LEGAL" AND 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN PERSPECTIVE: A 
REPLY TO RICHARD PILDES 
Charles A. Heckman* 
I. INTRODUCfiON 
The apparently innocent phrase "legal history" has demon-
strated itself to be extremely treacherous territory. It encom-
passes both history and law, each a full discipline in itself. Ordi-
nary law teachers who tire of the case method and practitioners 
who look to do something with their golden years venture there 
at their peril, for, untrained in historical method, they may con-
centrate entirely on evolution of doctrine and ignore historical 
context. The results of that approach, if published at all, look 
something like a law brief, but set in an earlier era. Entering the 
country from the far border, we have the historian who, with in-
adequate legal training, decides that what the judges say makes 
no difference at all, primarily because the historian does not un-
derstand it. For such a person, context is everything. The result 
of that kind of endeavor ignores the fact that whether or not we 
believe that judges generally admit the real reasons for what 
they are doing, we cannot know whether judges are right or 
wrong, dissembling or forthright, without examining closely what 
they have to say. As Karl Llewellyn, who certainly did not take 
judicial language at face value, remarked: "Now the first thing 
you are to do with an opinion is to read it. . . . It is a pity, but 
you must learn to read. To read each word. To understand each 
word." 1 Ideally, therefore, legal history should reflect both the 
relevant state of legal institutions and doctrines and their inter-
action with their context. 
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Professor Richard Pildes certainly does not fit either of 
these stereotypes; but in spite of his well merited credentials and 
reputation, his piece, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the 
Canon/ demonstrates that both Homer and Pildes can nod? 
The Canon displays superb historical scholarship, but its end re-
sult is seriously marred by a failure to take Llewellyn's advice to 
heart. It recounts one of the great tragedies of American his-
tory, the loss of black voting rights in the South between 1890 
and 1910. The Canon gives us a painfully clear picture of the 
methods the Southern oligarchs used to disfranchise blacks and 
poor whites as well. It goes on to say, however, that the true 
death-knell of black rights was sounded when the Supreme 
Court held in 1903 that federal courts did not have jurisdiction to 
grant equitable relief for voting abuses. According to The 
Canon, this little-known case, Giles v. Harris,4 represents a ma-
jor turning point in American jurisprudence, "one of the most 
momentous decisions in United States Supreme Court history 
and one of the most revealing. "5 The Canon focuses enormous 
erudition on the historical context of Giles. The author appears 
to have read and analyzed in depth, and presents for our inspec-
tion, every possible source, except one-the case of Giles v. Har-
ris. When one finishes the essay, one knows everything about 
the disgraceful disfranchisement of black voters at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, except the state of the law analyzed in 
the various opinions in Giles. Because of this lack of analysis, it 
turns out that The Canon also misses some of the most impor-
tant issues of social and historical context of the case, as well as 
another case that really did make a difference. 
To be sure, The Canon gives us the broad outline of Giles. 
Giles was a black man who had sought to register to vote under 
the newly restrictive clauses of the Alabama constitution of 1901, 
and had been refused. He filed a bill for injunctive relief in fed-
eral court, asking that the state be required to register him as a 
voter and that the Alabama registration system be found uncon-
stitutional. In a short opinion, the newly appointed Oliver 
Wendell Holmes glossed over the jurisdictional issues and went 
to the merits of the case. Accepting the bill at face value, he 
said, the Court could not require Giles's registration under exist-
2. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 Const. 
Comm. 295 (2001) ("The Canon"). 
3. Cf. Horace, Ars Poetica, line 359 "Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus." 
4. 189 u.s. 475 (1903). 
5. Pildes, The Canon at 297 (cited in note 2). 
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ing Alabama law because of his own allegation, which had to be 
accepted as true for purposes of this appeal, that that law vio-
lated the federal Constitution. On the other hand, Holmes held 
that the federal courts could not give equitable relief to enforce 
political rights, and therefore the general remedy of declaring 
the restrictive sections of the Alabama constitution contrary to 
federal law and supervising the reformulation of the Alabama 
electoral system was not available. According to The Canon, 
this denial of remedy marked the case's place in history, and put 
the federal stamp of approval on the disfranchisement of blacks 
in the South. 
II. WHAT A CLOSE READING OF GILES REVEALS 
The Canon contains little discussion of Holmes's legal 
analysis or of the dissents. As far as The Canon is concerned, 
Holmes refused equitable relief, and Southern blacks lost the 
right to vote. The latter must have ensued from the former, and 
the Court should have decided some other way. One can cer-
tainly concur that the disfranchisement of black voters in the 
South was a national disgrace, but because it does not analyze 
Giles carefully, The Canon not only overemphasizes the impor-
tance of the case, but also fails to find Mills v. Green, the case 
that was the key to the situation.6 
The Canon briefly criticizes Holmes's jurisdictional holding, 
but otherwise takes no notice of the complicated procedural pos-
ture of the case, which is the most questionable part of the 
Holmes decision and the essential issue of the dissents. The 
Canon does not explain that the trial judge had dismissed the 
case for lack of jurisdiction, and under federal procedure of the 
time a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, in the form of a cer-
tificate from the trial judge, was available, but limited to the 
question of jurisdiction.7 The Court was prohibited from consid-
ering the merits, since no trial had taken place. It was not clear 
here whether the trial court had dismissed because it thought it 
had no jurisdiction to grant the equitable relief requested, or be-
cause the required jurisdictional amount had not been alleged in 
the bill. 
The Canon's inattention to procedural detail is exemplified 
by a misstatement of Holmes's holding on the subject of jurisdic-
6. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895); see text accompanying note 23. 
7. 15 Stat. 827, Fifty-First Congress, Sess. II, Ch. 517, Sec. 5 (1891). 
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tiona! amount. The Canon states, "Holmes found ... that the 
complaint did allege the requisite amount in controversy .... "8 
In fact, Holmes found that the jurisdictional amount was not 
pleaded,9 and that jurisdiction was the only issue raised by the 
certificate of appeal. According to Holmes, however, direct ap-
peal to the Supreme Court could be founded on other sections of 
the applicable judiciary act, and therefore he could treat the cer-
tificate as opening the entire record. 
Holmes based this holding on dubious logic. He an-
nounced: 
But, assuming that the allegation should have been made in a 
case like this, the objection to its omission was not raised in 
the Circuit Court, and as it could have been remedied by 
amendment, we think it unavailing. 
* * * 
Although the certificate relates only to the jurisdiction of that 
court as a court of the United States, yet, as the ground of the 
bill is that the constitution of Alabama is in contravention of 
the Constitution of the United States, the appeal opens the 
whole case under the act of 1891, c. 517, § 5 (26 Stat. 827). The 
plaintiff had the right to appeal directly to this court. The cer-
tificate was unnecessary to found the jurisdiction of this court, 
and could not narrow it. As the case properly is here we pro-
ceed to consider the substance of the complaint. 10 
This statement contains some dubious propositions. First and 
foremost, subject matter jurisdiction of a court has to appear af-
firmatively from the record. A court of appeal has no right to 
assume the matter could be rectified by amendment. 11 Perhaps 
jurisdiction does not exist and the plaintiff could not properly so 
represent. 
The second problem is that Holmes had no authority for his 
assertion that the jurisdictional certificate opened the whole re-
cord. The statute could most logically be read to indicate the 
opposite. This case was before the Court pursuant to a certifi-
cate under Section 5 of the Act of 1891: 
8. Pildes, The Canon at 305 n.44 (cited in note 2). 
9. 189 U.S. at 485. 
10. ld. at 485-86. 
11. See id. (Harlan, 1 ., dissenting). 
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That appeals or writs of error may be taken from the dis-
trict courts or from the existing circuit courts direct to the Su-
preme Court in the following cases: 
In any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue; 
in such cases the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certi-
fied to the Supreme Court from the court below for deci-
. 12 
SIOn. 
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This language would seem to be fairly exclusive: Only jurisdic-
tion should be considered on certificate from the district or cir-
cuit court. That exclusivity seems to be emphasized by the pro-
cedure for certification of issues provided by section 6 regarding 
certification by the newly created circuit courts of appeals: 
[I]n every such subject within its appellate jurisdiction the cir-
cuit court of appeals at any time may certify to the Supreme 
Court of the United States any questions or propositions of 
law concerning which it desires the instruction of that court 
for its proper decision. And thereupon the Supreme Court 
may either give its instruction on the questions and proposi-
tions certified to it, which shall be binding upon the circuit 
courts of appeals in such case, or it may require that the whole 
record and cause may be sent up to it for its consideration, 
and thereupon shall decide the whole matter in controversy in 
the same manner as if it had been brought there for review by 
. f I 13 wnt o error or appea . 
This section provides in the most specific terms for opening 
the entire record after certification of a single issue by the circuit 
courts of appeal, and is found in the section immediately follow-
ing that on which Holmes relied. It seems to be a fairly clear 
case of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. If Congress had 
wanted to provide for opening the entire record upon jurisdic-
tional certification pursuant to section 5, both the issue and the 
means for dealing with it were apparent. The statute did not 
give the Court this power, and Holmes offered no other author-
ity. 
Holmes was, therefore, probably wrong, as The Canon ac-
curately notes, to open the entire case, but there were extenuat-
ing circumstances. Perhaps as a consequence of failing to look 
closely at procedural issues, The Canon ignores that a different 
holding in Giles would not necessarily have led to a different re-
12. 26 Stat. at 827. 
13. Id. at 828. 
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sult. Since no trial had occurred in the case, if the Court had de-
cided the jurisdictional matter in favor of the plaintiff, the whole 
case would simply have gone back for trial before the same un-
friendly judge who had dismissed it. What findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, or formulation of remedy (in the unlikely event 
he decided any was necessary) would they get out of him? 
Whatever he decided, the inevitable appeals would have ensued, 
this time possibly to the circuit court of appeals, because the is-
sue would not be jurisdictional, and then finally to the Supreme 
Court again. The Alabama Constitution of 1901 would have had 
more time to settle, and the problems of what remedy to formu-
late and what political power would enforce it would have be-
come even more acute. 
These observations cast light on the curious posture of the 
litigation in Giles. There are indications that everyone except 
Harlan was in a great hurry to ,pet rid of this case. The Court 
dispensed with oral arguments, 1 certainly an unusual action for 
a matter of great importance. The pleadings appeared to be 
careless. Plaintiff's counsel, as The Canon points out, was a well 
experienced person hired with Booker T. Washington's money. 
He surely knew about pleading jurisdictional amount. The at-
torney for Alabama, if he had wanted to delay, could have raised 
the issue of jurisdictional amount in the trial court, thereby mak-
ing amendment by plaintiff, immediate trial on the merits, and a 
lengthy appeal process more likely. One sentence in either the 
complaint or answer could have changed the course of the litiga-
tion, but neither of two presumably competent lawyers included 
it. 
There may be a reason for what appears to have been 
sloppy lawyering. Plaintiff's lawyer was attempting to persuade 
the Court that the Civil Rights Act of 187115 extended equitable 
relief to voting rights violations. That Act provided for equita-
ble relief and had its own jurisdictional clause that did not re-
quire a specific amount in issue. The problem was that the Act 
did not specifically extend equitable relief to voting rights, but 
mentioned it only generally, and there was already federal 
precedent against plaintiff's position.16 Nevertheless, plaintiff's 
election not to allege the jurisdictional amount may have arisen 
from a desire to emphasize the importance of the 1871 Act. 
14. 189 U.S. 494 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
15. 17 Stat.13,Sec.1 (1871). 
16. See the discussion accompanying and following footnote 23. 
2002] KEEPING LEGAL HISTORY "LEGAL" 631 
Holmes's discussion of this jurisdictional issue is instructive. 
The only precedent he gives for not dismissing for failure to 
plead the jurisdictional amount is that "[i]n Mills v. Green . .. no 
notice was taken of the absence of an allegation of value in a 
case like this. "17 This kind of thing is nonsense, and Holmes 
knew nonsense when he saw it. The fact that a court did not no-
tice something does not set a precedent for not noticing it again. 
Furthermore, in Mills the plaintiff lost in the Supreme Court on 
other grounds. Although it would surely be customary to re-
solve a jurisdictional issue first on an appeal, there was no abso-
lute need to resolve the matter since plaintiff was going to lose 
anyway. The curious reverse side of this coin is that if the Giles 
case had been decided differently, it would not have merited so 
much as a footnote even in Professor Pildes's canon. It would 
have been a mere procedural prelude to the dispositive opinion, 
the one that would have undoubtedly followed, at some length, 
the trial and possible intermediate appeal of the case on the mer-
its. 
There were three dissents in Giles, by Brewer, Brown (with 
no opinion), and Harlan, to which The Canon devotes almost no 
attention. 1 Ironically, The Canon characterizes Harlan as a 
"great dissenter," 19 but then ignores his dissent. But Harlan's 
dissent is not a dissent as to result- he also would have affirmed 
for lack of jurisdiction, but only on the issue of jurisdictional 
amount. That issue, he thought correctly, could not be waived 
by any of the parties. Harlan did say, however, that he disagreed 
with Holmes on the merits, and that he agreed with Brewer's 
opinion that courts could give relief in such cases. He did not, 
however, say what kind of relief. Even Harlan, then, is not on 
record as advocating equitable relief.20 
The Brewer dissent is more instructive. Brewer objected 
that Holmes was not addressing jurisdictional issues, which were 
all that could be addressed on a direct certificate to the Supreme 
Court. He thought the complaint stated a federal cause, but he 
did not reach a conclusion as to whether injunctive relief could 
be granted. Neither Brewer nor Harlan could cite a precedent 
for such action. The cases on record finding federal jurisdiction 
17. 189 U.S. at 485. 
18. The total discussion of the dissents consists of : "Holmes' opinion for the 6-3 
divided Court," (p. 305) and "Still, there were dissenting voices, not just that of the great 
dissenter Justice Harlan, who indeed did so here again, ... " (p. 312). 
19. Pildes, The Canon at 312 (cited in note 2). 
20. 189 U.S. at 504. 
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in such matters were all cases granting money damages for dep-
rivation of voting rights.21 Brewer did not reach the issue of eq-
uitable relief: "Whether the plaintiff's remedl was at law or in 
equity, cannot be considered on this appeal."2 As far as Brewer 
was concerned, the federal courts had subject matter jurisdiction, 
and the case should have been sent back for trial. The question 
of remedy was not one of jurisdiction, and therefore would have 
to be addressed through the normal appeals process after trial. 
The Brewer opinion, with its list of federal precedents for 
granting money damages in voting rights cases, raises another in-
teresting question. After the Supreme Court decision in Giles, 
the plaintiff brought suit in state court for damages and, pre-
dictably, lost in the Alabama Supreme Court. With substantial 
decisions upholding a federal cause of action for such damages, 
why on earth did Giles bring suit in the forum where success was 
least likely? 
The refusal of anyone on the Court to say specifically that 
equitable relief was appropriate was no mere technicality, for if 
all anyone was saying was that money damages were available in 
this case, the ineffectiveness of that remedy to achieve the 
broader aim of avoiding disfranchisement of blacks was already 
established. Bringing such cases one by one with the oligarchs in 
the background ready to reimburse their political hacks on the 
rare occasions when a Southern jury penalized them would ac-
complish nothing. That was why the Giles plaintiff sought a dif-
ferent, broader remedy. 
The justices were finessing the equitable remedy issue be-
cause of a far more important case than Giles. One of the rea-
sons to read an inapposite case carefully in legal research, as well 
as to read dissents even though their opinions have not pre-
vailed, is that both the inapposite case and the dissents may cite 
the really important case, and that is true here. As we read both 
the Holmes opinion and the dissents, we find the whole discus-
sion occurs under the shadow of a case styled Mills v. Green. 23 It 
turns out to be the case The Canon really should have discussed. 
In 1894 South Carolina had passed a statute calling for a 
constitutional convention in September, 1895. That convention 
would, in fact, put in place the final restrictions on black voting 
21. Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902). 
22. 189 U.S. at 488-89. 
23. 159 u.s. 651 (1895). 
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rights in that state.24 The South Carolina registration law in 
question allowed registration on only ten days a year, in March, 
and required that all voters be in possession of their registration 
papers at all times. Plaintiff had been prevented from register-
ing during the critical ten days, and he claimed these restrictions 
were unconstitutional. The Mills plaintiff and other similarly 
placed South Carolina citizens sued for injunctive relief?5 
The District Court granted plaintiff's relief, but was re-
versed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
an opinion written by none other than the Chief Justice of the 
United States, Melville Weston Fuller, as circuit justice.26 In his 
opinion Fuller held that equitable relief was not available to en-
force political rights: 
It is well settled that a court of chancery is conversant only 
with matters of property and the maintenance of civil rights. 
The court has no jurisdiction in matters of a political nature, 
nor to interfere with the duties of any department of govern-
ment, unless under special circumstances, and when necessary 
to the protection of rights of property, nor in matters merely 
criminal, or merely immoral, which do not affect any right of 
27 property. 
Wait a minute, some will say. Why isn't the right to vote a 
civil right? Well, under the narrow definition the nineteenth 
century courts were imposing, it just wasn't, and in fact Fuller 
had a plethora of authority to back him for this proposition. The 
case upon which he relied most heavily was the Illinois case of 
Fletcher v. Tuttle,28 in which the plaintiff complained of being 
deprived of voting rights. The Illinois court held voting rights 
were political, not civil, rights: 
From the foregoing statement of these two bills it seems to be 
perfectly plain that the entire scope and object of both is the 
assertion and protection of political, as contradistinguished 
from civil, personal or property rights. In both the complain-
ant is a legal voter, and a candidate for a particular elective 
24. Pildes, The Canon at 301 (cited in note 2). 
25. Curiously enough, and perhaps buttressing The Canon's point that laws disfran-
chising blacks also disfranchised poor whites, the voters in Mills did not allege their own 
race or the racial bias of the registration laws. See concurring opinion of Judge Hughes, 
69 Fed. at 862. Judge Hughes thought this changed the constitutional analysis, since he 
thought a Fifteenth Amendment claim was not stated. Fuller, however, did not pick up 
on this point, nor did the Supreme Court in affirming. 
26. Green v. Mills, 69 F. 852 (1895). 
27. 69 Fed. at 858. 
28. 37 N.E. 683 (1894). 
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office, and by his bill he is seeking the protection and en-
forcement of his ri~ht to cast his own ballot in a legal and ef-
fective manner .... 9 
The court went on to draw this distinction between civil and 
political rights: 
As defined by Anderson, a civil right is, "a right accorded to 
every member of a distinct community or nation," while a po-
litical right is a "right exercisable in the administration of 
government." Anderson's Law Diet. 905. Says Bouvier: "Po-
litical rights consist in the power to participate, directly or in-
directly, in the establishment or management of the govern-
ment. These political rights are fixed by the Constitution. 
Every citizen has the right of voting for public officers, and of 
being elected; these are the political rights which the humblest 
citizen possesses. Civil rights are those which have no relation 
to the establishment, support or management of the govern-
ment. They consist in the power of acquiring and enjoying 
property, or exercising the paternal and marital powers, and 
the like. It will be observed that every one, unless deprived of 
them by sentence of civil death, is in the enjoyment of his civil 
rights,-which is not the case with political rights; for an alien, 
for example, has no political, althoush in full enjoyment of his 
civil rights." 2 Bouv. Law Diet. 597.3 
In his concurring Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Mills, 
Judge Robert Hughes made a point which Holmes appeared to 
have picked up in Giles. Hughes contended that courts could 
not restrain other branches of government from exercising their 
functions generally, but could grant individual relief for malad-
ministration. Thus Mills could have enforced his right to vote 
individually, but could not bring the general action he sought 
here: "I repeat that in the case at bar it may have been compe-
tent for the court to grant individual relief. But the bill asked 
more. It asked similar relief for all citizens of the county situ-
ated like the complainant."31 
This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court. There, 
Justice Gray duly issued an opinion for a unanimous court that 
really was the kind of disingenuous nonsense that The Canon 
seems to consider the Giles opinion to be. In both Mills and 
Giles the plaintiffs had alleged that they wished to vote in spe-
29. !d. at 686. 
30. !d. at 686. 
31. 69 Fed. at 865. 
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cific elections in the near future, a supposedly necessary allega-
tion to satisfy nineteenth century notions of mootness. Justice 
Gray sidestepped the issue of equitable remedy and held that 
since the election in which plaintiff alleged he wished to vote had 
now passed through no fault of either party, no relief could be 
granted because the issue was moot.32 
There are a number of reasons why Mills is a far more im-
portant case than Giles. First, the Fuller opinion indicates that 
the views on equitable relief in voting rights cases had already 
crystallized in 1895, and their expression in the Circuit Court of 
Appeals had been unanimously affirmed, albeit on the basis of 
other logic, by the Supreme Court. The Giles doctrine was not a 
Holmes invention, and there was probably nothing that the new-
est justice could have done to change the situation in 1903. 
Second, although even The Canon recognizes that the like-
lihood of successful judicial intervention was remote in Giles, the 
chances for success were much greater in Mills. In Mills the dis-
franchisement scheme was fairly new and not yet embedded in 
the state constitution. Injunctive relief maintaining black voter 
registration and restraining the implementation of a new system 
would have been conceptually much easier to award and enforce 
than dismantling a complex system that had already operated for 
several years, which was what the plaintiffs in Giles confronted. 
The District Court in Mills, in fact, was ready to give injunctive 
relief. 
It is possible to imagine a scenario in which a coalition of 
blacks and poor whites, not yet definitively purged from the vot-
ing rolls and energized by judicial victories and injunctive relief, 
would turn out en masse to defeat efforts to subjugate them. 
Furthermore, as The Canon points out, in 1896 Congress was still 
actively enforcing voting rights.33 In 1895, therefore, there re-
mained a firm political support for black voting rights, which 
might have needed only a Supreme Court decision to solidify. It 
is much more difficult to imagine uprooting a system thoroughly 
imposed on a cowed populace in 1903. In Mills the battle was 
just beginning; in Giles it was already lost. 
32. This kind of reasoning did not become definitively obsolete until Moore v. 
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); see the discussion at note 38. 
33. "Thus, the House was aggressively wielding its power to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment throughout this period. As late as 1896, it remained virtually undisputed in 
the House that it had the power to conclude, in the context of judging elections, that state 
registration statutes were unconstitutional." Pildes, The Canon at 309 (cited in note 2). 
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Mills shows the Court in a far worse light than Giles. The 
Court could easily have reasoned its way around the mootness 
issue if it had wanted to reach the merits. Holmes was able to do 
that a few years later in Giles without attracting the slightest at-
tention.34 The defendant was an officer of the state that had 
called the unconstitutional election and, even if the convention 
was past, the abuses complained of still existed. In fact, the 
holding in Mills made it difficult for the Supreme Court ever to 
reach the merits in any voting rights case, for given the normal 
delays in the federal judicial process, a suit seeking the vote in 
any particular election would always be moot. In fact, a suit in 
federal court for money damages for wrongful denial of the right 
to vote in South Carolina's Congressional elections of 1894 was 
tried on the merits and did not reach the Supreme Court until 
1900.35 
This point suggests the issue on which Giles really was 
ground-breaking, and in a positive sense. The plaintiff in Giles, 
in order to avoid mootness, had alleged that he wished to vote in 
the Congressional elections of 1902. Those elections, as was the 
case in Mills, had already passed. Homes did not let this deter 
him: 
Perhaps it should be added to the foregoing statement that 
the bill was filed in September, 1902, and alleged the plain-
tiff's desire to vote at an election coming off in November. 
This election has gone by, so that it is impossible to give spe-
cific relief with regard to that. But we are not prepared to 
dismiss the bill or the appeal on that ground, because to be 
enabled to cast a vote in that election is not, as in Mills v. 
Green, 159 U.S. 651, 657, the whole object of the bill. It is not 
even the principal object of the relief sought by the plaintiff. 
The principal object of that is to obtain the permanent advan-
tages of registration as of a date before 1903.36 
Of course, voting in any one election was not the object of 
the litigation in Mills any more than it was in Giles. The object, 
as Judge Hughes pointed out, was the wholesale registration of 
(presumably black) voters. Holmes is distinguishing without a 
difference, but in doing so he was getting to the real issue. Al-
though Holmes may deserve some lumps for writing the Giles 
opinion, he ought to receive a good deal of credit for this hold-
34. Sec text accompanying note 36. 
35. Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900). 
36. 189 U.S. at484. 
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ing. What he is doing here actually foreshadows the "capable of 
repetition, yet evading review" doctrine of Southern Pacific 
Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. 37 He was cre-
ating a doctrine that could have eased the way for many future 
voting rights cases. I say "could have," because, perhaps due to 
the obscurity of the Giles decision, the old saws of Mills were not 
removed from our jurisprudence until Moore v. Ogilvie38 ex-
tended the "capable of repetition" doctrine to voting rights in 
1969. Even there, the dissent was still protestin¥. that relief could 
not be granted because the election had passed. 9 
In summary, a close reading of Giles tells us that it was basi-
cally concerned with procedural issues of no lasting conse-
quence. Examining all the opinions in Giles, however, shows us 
that the substantive doctrine it supposedly announced was al-
ready embedded in federal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court 
had demonstrated eight years earlier in Mills that it would not 
get involved in the issue of black voting rights. 
III. HOLMES REDUX 
At first and casual reading, it may seem that The Canon has 
succumbed to the temptation to engage in big-game hunting, a 
sport that all red-blooded law professors enjoy. How many of us 
want to waste ink chastising Justice Samuel Blatchford when we 
can knock a giant off a pedestal? Thus we may carelessly accuse 
The Canon of yielding to the temptation of the glamor and fun 
of going on safari to take shots at tawny lion Holmes rather than 
staying at home to set traps for mouse Gray who wrought havoc 
in the larder. 
A more careful reading, however, suggests that The Canon 
merely demonstrates the unease that many modern liberals suf-
fer with Holmes. It is not clear from The Canon whether Pildes 
is more annoyed with the Court or with Holmes. Giles was, after 
all, a 6-3 decision (actually 7-2 if you count the fact that Harlan 
would also have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). If Holmes 
had chosen this moment to write the first of his eloquent dis-
sents, it would have been just that, a dissent. All that would 
have changed was the margin of majority. 
37. 219 U.S. 498 at 515 (1911). 
38. 394 U.S. 814 (1969). 
39. ld. at 820 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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The Canon attacks the Holmes opinion, but nowhere does it 
suggest that Holmes was wrong as a matter of doctrine. In fact, 
the Mills decision indicated that Holmes was doctrinally correct. 
To be sure, Holmes was writing for the court of last resort. If he 
had wanted to write an opinion granting relief, and succeeded in 
persuading a majority of justices that a remedy should be given, 
there was no tribunal to gainsay him. But I suggest that political 
realities did not coincide with such a view. If there had been an 
established tradition of equitable enforcement of political rights, 
the Holmes decision would have been pusillanimous indeed. 
Under such circumstances giving relief would have had a fair 
chance of acceptance in the legal community, a fact which might 
indeed have created a moral force in the general community and 
perhaps even support in the political process. On the other 
hand, if, as was the case, the Court was going to have to create 
such a remedy out of whole cloth, its chances of acceptance any-
where were close to non-existent, and the danger to the Court's 
prestige and power was grave. 
The Canon suggests that a decision granting relief might 
possibly have had some sort of effect in North Carolina and 
Alabama, where the majorities in favor of curtailing voting rights 
were slim at best.40 It does not say how this would have hap-
pened, since the essay admits that no political authority was pre-
pared to back the Court. I doubt the proposition. Whether they 
had political majorities or not, the oligarchs had their disfran-
chising constitutions firmly in place in North Carolina in 1900 
and Alabama in 1901, and rooting them out in 1903 would not 
have been easy. The Canon remarks that "[e]ven nearly a cen-
tury later, Holmes was not far off the mark in envisioning a per-
vasive national presence in the South as the predicate to full 
black political participation,"41 and makes the point that "[o]ne 
of the most robust observations political scientists have made is 
that electoral structures once put into place 'tend to be very sta-
ble and to resist change.'"42 
40. Even that contention is open to some doubt. Although The Canon builds a 
good case that the Alabama constitution passed only by virtue of electoral fiddling 
(Pildes, The Canon at 315-16 (cited in note 2)), it also makes the odd statement that in 
North Carolina the disfranchising constitution passed with a margin of "only" 58.6% of 
the white vote (Pildes, The Canon at 313 (cited in note 2)) with, presumably, 41.4% 
against. That a margin of 17.2% is narrow would be news to a great many political can-
didates around this nation. 
41. ld. at 311-12. 
42. Id. at 313, citing Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and 
Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries 52 (Yale U. Press, 1994). 
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In all likelihood, if the Court had thrown out the Alabama 
and North Carolina electoral systems, the oligarchs would simply 
have reopened their bags of shoddy political tricks and rigged 
the system once again. The more or less ongoing nature of hu-
man personalities and social and political institutions would sug-
gest such a continuity of events, just as one might reasonably 
speculate that Louis XVI and James II were going to come to 
grief regardless of the occurrence of the particular events that 
triggered the French and English Revolutions. Of course, some 
latter-day Joan of Arc might have descended from the northeast 
Alabama hills as a successful champion of democracy. Playing 
"what if" with history is always tricky. In the absence of the 
proof of the actual events, no one would be likely to imagine 
that a fifth-rate artist from Vienna would overthrow German 
democracy and lead the world to cataclysm, or that a fifth-rate 
actor in the early stages of Alzheimer's Disease would become 
the leader of the world's greatest power and a principal agent in 
the demise of the second greatest. When it comes to dangerous 
partners in guessing games, history's muse Clio does not even 
take a back seat to Puccini's Princess Turandot. But it rests with 
the proponent of such unlikely events to give us a reasonable 
scenario for their occurrence, and The Canon makes no attempt 
to do so. 
Even assuming, however, that a decision opposing disfran-
chisement would somehow have affected the outcome in North 
Carolina and Alabama, there were still nine other ex-
Confederate states where even The Canon does not profess to 
see hope.43 If nine states instead of eleven had flouted a Su-
preme Court decision, there would have been some gain for de-
mocracy in the short run, but where would that have left the in-
stitution? Would it have had the power and the will to impose 
Brown and the other Warren reforms fifty years later? 
Since a different opinion by Holmes would probably not 
have affected the outcome of Giles, The Canon's criticism would 
be more properly directed at the Court than at Holmes, but the 
tone of the essay is one of almost personal animosity towards 
Holmes, characterizing his analysis as "fascinatingly repellent. "44 
Given the level of dramatic intensity provided by most cases fo-
cussing on scope of review in jurisdictional appeals, such a com-
43. There were, of course, voting and civil rights abuses in states that did not se-
cede, so that perhaps the number was greater than nine. 
44. Pildes, The Canon at 298 (cited in note 2). 
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ment by a teacher of law might be a compliment; but The 
Canon's subsequent comments eliminate any such ambiguity. 
As an example, take this sentence: "With typical perverse de-
light, Holmes stared these claims in their face and represented 
them starkly: 'The white men generally are registered for good 
under the easy test and the black men are likely to be kept out in 
the future as in the past. .... "'45 The Canon does not tell us that 
Holmes was merely summarizing the pleadings in this state-
ment.46 If that is what they said, why should they be misrepre-
sented? We may ask further: In what ways was delight in per-
versity "typical" of Holmes? And why is this perverse? At least 
Holmes was setting out the real issues and consequences for the 
world to examine and, possibly, to act on in the political arena. 
Surely this is far better than the performance in Mills where the 
Court simply closed its eyes and ignored the harm it was doing. 
The Canon then criticizes Holmes for skipping over the ju-
risdictional issues to get to the merits of the case. I can agree 
that it was probably legally indefensible to ignore the jurisdic-
tional issues, but morally and politically it may have been pref-
erable to tell the world where the Court stood as soon as possi-
ble. How would the situation have improved if the case had been 
sent back down on the jurisdictional issue, only to come back up 
for a review on the merits several years later? Nothing would 
indicate that the Court was going to do a volte-face on these is-
sues any time soon. 
The Canon bitterly denounces Holmes for the first point in 
his analysis: "As the first such 'final consideration,' there then 
follows the most legally disingenuous analysis in the pages of the 
U.S. Reports."47 The Canon accuses Holmes of putting the 
plaintiff in Giles in a "Catch 22" situation. Holmes pointed out 
that the plaintiff had requested both that he be registered under 
the existing system, and that the existing system be ruled uncon-
stitutional. These were inconsistent remedies, Holmes thought, 
since if the system were unconstitutional, it would be improper 
to implement it by requiring a registration under it. Holmes is, 
perhaps, regrettably emphatic in making this point. He may be 
reaching a bit to justify an opinion with which he felt morally 
uneasy. I think that even the most convinced Holmophile would 
not think that Giles was one of his better opinions, but I also 
45. ld. at 305. 
46. It does say he was "represent[ing)" the "claims." I d. 
47. ld. at 306. 
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think we can absolve him of the "Catch 22" charge. It would not 
have made much sense to require Giles's registration under the 
existing system, and then to throw out the system as unconstitu-
tional. On the other hand, even if it had been possible to find 
that the system was constitutional and that Giles met its complex 
qualifications and should be registered, registering Giles and 
others by inspecting their credentials individually would have 
had virtually no impact on the electoral process: 
It seems to us that unless we are prepared to say ... the regis-
tration plan of the Alabama Constitution is valid, we cannot 
order the plaintiff's name to be registered. It is not an answer 
to say that if all the blacks who are qualified according to the 
letter of the instrument were registered, the fraud would be 
cured. In the first place, there is no probability that any way 
now is op
8
en by which more than a few could be regis-
tered .... 
In this quote, Holmes seems to be picking up the point 
Judge Hughes made in the concurring opinion in Mills, 49 that the 
courts could grant individual relief but not group relief; but, of 
course, feeding the cases one by one through the court system 
would have virtually no impact on the voting balance. Holmes 
was merely boiling the case down to what Giles really wanted, 
mass registration of black voters, and saying the Court could not 
accomplish it. We may not like this reality, or, with The Canon, 
think that it may not necessarily have been reality, but at least 
Holmes had the courage to face the issue, as even The Canon 
appears to admit.50 The real "Catch 22" was Millis v. Green, 
where the Court said that there may be a justiciable issue, but we 
will never get to it because the election will always be over be-
fore the appeal reaches us. 
The Canon criticizes Holmes for facing the reality that a 
massive Court plan for voter registration would be unenforce-
able, but in the very next paragraph appears to concede the truth 
of the statement: 
The Court transformed this resistance into the sweeping doc-
trinal principle that equity cannot enforce "political rights." 
Thus, Holmes, concluded, relief "from a great political wrong, 
48. 189 U.S. at 487. 
49. See the text accompanying note 31. 
50. "Giles' complaint, Holmes baldly states, is 'that the great mass of the white 
population intends to keep the blacks from voting.' But from this it follows, he asserts, 
that if 'the conspiracy and the intent exist, a name on a piece of paper will not defeat 
them."' Pildes, The Canon at 306 (cited in note 2). 
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if done, as alleged, by the people of a state and the State itself, 
must be given by them or by the legislative and political de-
partment of the United States." Holmes had every reason to 
know this would not be forthcoming, given the political con-
text at the time-indeed, it is the very fear that any Court or-
der would not be supported by the other branches of the na-
tional government that underlies the Court's self-
b . 51 a negation. 
If "Holmes had every reason to know" that he could not is-
sue an enforceable decree, it is hard to see why he was wrong to 
recognize that fact publicly. 
IV. CONCLUSION: OF JUDICIAL ACfiVISM AND 
RESTRAINT 
It seems to me that we face a question here about our basic 
attitudes concerning judicial activism and restraint. Those of us 
who applaud the accomplishments of the Warren Court-and I 
am one of them- have come to have a very rosy view of judicial 
activism. Support for either judicial activism or judicial restraint 
is defensible, but neither is defensible if its exercise is to be de-
termined by political outcome. It is neither politically nor phi-
losophically appropriate for conservatives to advocate, as many 
do today, "judicial restraint" in enforcing rights on the liberal 
agenda, but to push for an activist roll-back of personal and po-
litical rights now firmly embedded and supported in our national 
polity. Neither, however, can liberals applaud the activism of 
the Warren Court, but then deny conservatives the right to a 
similar activism because the Court has changed political com-
plexion. 
Those of us who rejoiced in the Warren activism should not 
forget that perhaps the most activist opinion in the history of the 
Court was Dred Scott v. Sandford.52 Through much of its his-
tory, and notably in Holmes's time, the federal courts have pos-
sessed neither the political views nor the talent to give liberals 
much faith in judicial activism. For every Marbury there is a 
Dred Scott, for every Marshall a McReynolds and a Butler. 
Poor old Ollie! It seems that every year his reputation di-
minishes. Richard Epstein and the conservatives excoriate him 
51. ld. at 306-07. 
52. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
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for his dissent in Lochner, 53 while liberals detest judicial restraint 
in cases like Giles and Buck v. Bell,54 which arguably laid the 
foundation for modern Frankfurterism. Really, however, in 
Giles he was merely being faithful to his own principles of judi-
cial restraint. We cannot accuse him of dissembling or legal mis-
interpretation (except in regard to the issue of the effect of the 
jurisdictional certificate), and certainly not of dodging the issues. 
We merely wish he had come out differently. Soon the only 
thing for which he will be favorably remembered is the funding 
of the Holmes Devise Series. 
Meanwhile, we would all do well to heed a voice from the 
more recent past. In 1961 Philip Kurland wrote a delightfully 
catty, witty, and insightful review of Karl Llewellyn's COMMON 
LAW TRADITION in which he makes the following observa-
tion: 
In view of the fact that the book might be appropriately subti-
tled "In Praise of Judges," it is further and ample evidence of 
the current trend among realist jurisprudes, of whom Lle-
wellyn is the self-proclaimed leader with a large following. In 
the 1930's, the new jurisprudence, derived from Austin, 
Holmes, and Cardozo, led the way in the demotion of the ju-
diciary from the high state of grace it then held: it made men 
of gods. The realist jurisprudence thus contributed to the 
transfer of effective law-making power from the bench to the 
legislature and executive, and more particularly to the latter 
in the form of administrative agencies. The very leaders of 
this group who once regarded the notion of the supremacy of 
the judiciary as anathema are now in the forefront of the 
movement to restore the judiciary to its place of power. The 
pendulum has completed its arc and is now being hurried in 
its return. 55 
The enthusiasm for the judiciary of which Kurland speaks was 
generated by the successful activism of the Warren Court, which 
was then in full sway, and I fully partook of that emotion. To-
day, however, we liberals have pushed the pendulum too far. It 
has exceeded its arc, and some of us have forgotten to let go. 
The pendulum stands out horizontally from its pivot point with 
53. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 703,734 (1984), who doubts that Holmes's dissent is "coherent." 
54. 274 u.s. 200 (1927). 
55. Philip B. Kurland, A Teacher's View (symposium review of Karl N. Llewellyn, 
The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960)), 28 U.Chi.L.Rev. 580, 582 
(1961). 
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the stragglers still clinging to it desperately. They look down on 
a surreal landscape of judicial activism of which the most out-
standing feature is Bush v. Gore. Be careful what you wish for, 
Professor Pildes. 
